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THE UNFINISHED TASK OF BRETTON WOODS: 
CREATING A GLOBAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ1 
[J\ s WE CELEBRATE the achievements ofBretton Woods some seventy years ago-the• 
.i"lcreation of the World Bank and the IMF-we have to be mindful of what migh,t .· 
. . 
ave been done that was not. When Keynes came to Bretton Woods, he had (at least) i 
'two ambitions. One was to rid the UK of the status of the reserve currency. He under-i 
' ' stood how adverse being the reserve currency was for the UK economy. But Keynes was• 
an internationalist: he did not simply want to foist the UK's problems on some other 
hapless country. He wanted to create a global reserve currency (for reasons that I shall 
·explain shortly). He succeeded in the first objective, but failed in the second, but not 
The United States was the central culprit. It was not that the United States did not 
, believe in international institutions: the country was, after all, behind the creation of 
. the United Nations (having perhaps come to realize the costs of not joining the League 
of Nations). It was to play a central role in the creation of the two new international 
1. Much of my work in this area has been done with Bruce Greenwald, to whom I owe a great debt. See Greenwald, B. 
and J.E. Stiglitz, "A Modest Proposal for International Monetary Reform," in S. Griffith-Jones, J .A. Ocampo, and 
J.E. Stlglitz (eds), Time for a Visible Hand: Lessons from the 2008 World Financial Crisis, Initiative for Polley Dialogue 
Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 314-344; and Greenwald, B. and J.E. Sdglitz, "Towards a New 
Global Reserves System," Journal of Globalization and Development, 1, 2 (2010). Some of the ideas here are elaborated 
in greater detail in Stiglitz, J.E., Making Globalization Work (New York: WW Norton, 2006). Financial support from 
INET is gratefully acknowledged. 
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economic institutions, the IMF and the World Bank. (It did not, however, sign on to 
what was supposed to be the third pillar of the new international economic order-an 
international trade organization, which was meant to prevent the kind of protectionism 
that had seemingly played such a role in the genesis of the Great Depression). But the 
. US Treasury-long captured by the special interests of its own financial markets, and, 
to this day, still more parochial in many ways than either the White House or the State 
Departmqit-seemingly saw the UK's weakness as an opportunity for the US dollar to 
become tlj.e new reserve currency. The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, 
opposed the creation of a new global reserve currency. He did not seem to understand 
the disadvantages of being the reserve currency. The advantages of being able to borrow 
at a low interest rate may have been more apparent than the disadvantages of the resulting 
appreciation of the currency and weakening of aggregate demand. Perhaps he and the 
Treasury !Department that he headed placed excessive value on the seeming hegemony 
that being. the reserve currency might give to the reserve currency country. 
Keynes thus lefi: Bretton Woods with one of the two missions accomplished: 
UK ceded the mantel of the reserve currency to the US, but he failed to create a new 
global reserve currency. 
There are, of course, three interacting reasons for this failure, which has proven to 
be so consequential: a failed understanding of the principles that govern international 
economics; a failure to be able to predict the evolution of the global economy, and 
what might be needed in response; and a failure of politics. It is the third that played 
the central role. It is important to understand the reasons for the failure if we are to 
rectify it: we have had ample opportunity to correct the mistake in the ensuing seventy 
years and to adapt to the changing global economic environment. Moreover, there 
have been significant increases in our understandings of the principles of economics. 
It is the politics that continues to be the impediment. One hopes that if we come to 
appreciate the consequences of what we have not done, there will be greater resolve to 
finish the µnfinished business of Bretton Woods. I will argue here that while there was 
a compelling case for creating such a global reserve currency in 1944, changes in the 
global ecohomy since have made doing so even more imperative. 
Keynes' overarching concern was the lack of global aggregate demand. It was this 
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with the end of World War II and the enormous source of demand !that it 
provided, the economy would revert to recession. These concerns turned out to be 
wrong, but for reasons that are just now coming to be well understood. 
The early part of the 20th century was a period of enormous economic trans-
formation-a movement from agriculture to manufacturing; the huge increases in 
agricultural productivity were a double-edged sword. Though it meant that fewer 
and fewer people were required to work to meet the world's food needs, the surplus 
labor had to move from agriculture to manufacturing, and from the rural to the ur-
ban sector. Markets do not make these transformations well on their own. Incomes of 
farmers in the United States fell by some 50 to 75 percent in the space of three years, 
from 1929 to 1932, and this decline in income meant that they couldn't afford to 
move, and couldn't afford to get the education and training required for the "new 
economy'' of the time. They were trapped, and so was the economy. The wa~ added 
demand, but it was also a major industrial policy, helping people move and to: get the 
training required. After the War, the GI bill provided a college education for anyone 
who had fought in the war (which was almost all young males) and wanted it.2 
There were four other reasons that the pessimism about a return to depression 
turned out to be unfounded. The first was that whatever the causes of the Great 
Depression, the debt accumulated by many in America in the years prior .exacer-
bated it, deepening and lengthening the downturn. The deflation as~ociated 
with the Depression made matters worse, as the effective leverage iricreased 
further. By contrast, the high savings rate during the war meant that hoJseholds 
lefr the war with a large legacy of savings. Indeed, the deficit was in their household 
assets, their durable goods. 
The second was that though there were global imbalances, with the US having 
large surpluses, the Marshall plan helped "recycle" these surpluses to the European 
. countries desperately in need of help. Later, global financial markets would allow 
developing and emerging countries to borrow large amounts, thereby supporting 
global aggregate demand. 
The third was that the US government itself continued with strong expansionary 
government policies, under both Truman and Eisenhower. Indeed, Eisenhower, a 
Republican, supported massive infrastructure, education and technology programs, 
2. Delli Gatti, D., M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald, A Russo and J.E. Sriglitz, "Mobility Constraints, Productlvity.'.rrends, 
and Extended Crises," journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83, 3 (2012): 375-393; Delli Gatti, Di, M. 
Gallegati, B. Greenwald, A. Russo and J.E. Stiglitz, "Sectoral Imbalances and Long Run Crises," in F. Allen, :M. Aoki, 
J.-P. Fitoussi, N. Klyotaki, R. Gordon, and J.E. Stiglitz (eds), The Global Macro Economy and Finance, lfu\ ~onference 
Volume No. 150-IIT (Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave), pp. 61-97. 
'i,' 
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so much so that even though the country had left the war with a record debt--
to-GDP ratio, in most years the government continued to run deficits.3 
The fuurth was that inequality fell precipitously ftom the heights reached 
during the roaring 1920s. As a rule, those at the top consume a far smaller fraction of 
their income than those at the bottom, so that unless something offsetting occurs 
(like the creation of a housing bubble), a growth of inequality will lead to a reduced 
aggregate demand.4 After World War II, the reverse occurred: greater equality led 
to stronger demand. 
Today, we have in some ways returned to the "under-consumption" era of the 
1930s. Emerging markets and developing countries that had sustained global aggregate 
demand learned the heavy lesson of the 1997 crisis: those running large deficits risked: 
a financial crisis in which they would lose their economic independence to the IMF 
and their creditors. They also learned the advantages of running a surplus: export-led 
growth proved to be the most effective development strategy ever conceived; lower 
exchange rates could help sustain these exports in manufacturing, which enabled the 
emerging markets to reduce the knowledge gap separating them from the advanced 
countries-a.gap even more important than the gap in resources.5 Countries could get 
a lower exchahge rate by building up reserves. 
The fundpnental law of trade, though, is that the sum of surpluses must equal the 
sum of deficits. If deficits are a problem, threatening economic stability, they are like a 
hot potato: a reduction of a deficit by one country must show up either in an increase 
in the deficit of another or a reduced surplus. And if the surplus countries actively 
and successfully managed to maintain their surpluses, then the reduced deficit by one 
country willbe manifested in an increase in the deficit of another. As countries realized 
the risks of deficits, each struggled to make sure that it would be some other country 
that had the deficit. The United States, the reserve currency country, became the deficit 
country of last resort. 
Triffin long ago pointed out the unsustainability of such a course of events:6 
these deficits, year after year, meant that confidence in the reserve currency country 
3. U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, "Federal Surplus or Deficit[-] as Percent of Gross Domestic Product" (2014), 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FYFSGDA188S (last accessed December 30, 2014). 
4. See Pikerty; T., Capital in the Twent:y-First Century (Cambridge, :MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2014); and Saez, E. and G. Zucman, ''Wealth Inequality in the Unites States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized 
Income Tax Data," NBER Working Paper 20625 (2014). The latter estimate that the average saving rate for the 
wealthiest 1 pttcent of Americans was 36 percent from 1986 to 2012. In the years before the crisis, savings for the bottom 
80 percent of Americans was negative; see Stiglitz, J.E., FreefalL· America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the Wor!.d Econo· 
my (New York: WW Norton, 2010). 
5. Greenwald, B. and J.E. Sriglitz, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Devef,/Jpmem, and Social 
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diminished.7 If confidence weakened enough, the country could no longer serve effec-
tively as a reserve currency. 
But there is another problem: the demand for reserves by others leads to a higher 
value to the reserve currency (the dollar), contributing to a trade deficit, weakening 
aggregate demand. If the reserve currency country is to maintain full employ:ment, 
this has to be offset somehow. The healthiest way is an investment boom; bui if in-
vestment outpaces underlying demand, there will eventually be excess capaci1l7, and 
it will not be sustained. In the case of the US tech bubble of the 1990s, the excess 
capacity was reached extraordinarily quickly. The US tried a second way-engineering 
a consumption bubble based on a housing bubble; bur for obvious reasons, that too 
could only be a short-run palliative. The more typical way is to run fiscal deficits, as 
the US did in the Reagan and Bush years, and in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. But 
this strategy exposes the country to a new form of the Triflin Paradox with the same 
consequences-the eventual erosion of confidence. Alternatively, the country striving 
not to expose itself to excessive indebtedness cues back on government spending, and 
sinks into a recession or an extended malaise--only slightly better for confidence, and 
worse for global demand. 
The consequences of this fundamental problem for global demand have been ex-
acerbated by three forces reminiscent of the pre-World War II era: growing inequality 
in most countries, 8 with many households, firms, and governments burdened by 
heavy debt, and the need for structural transformation, indeed two transformations-
now not from agricultural to manufacturing, but from manufacturing to the service 
sector; and a transformation necessitated by massive changes in global comp·arative 
advantage. A;; we noted, markets do )lOt make these transformations smoothly on 
theii own; and in the absence of government assistance, there is a high risk of getting 
trapped into structural stagnation. 
I 
In addition, there are two further factors making matters worse tod~y. We 
noted chat surpluses need not be a problem if the surpluses can be recycled!' either 
through foreign assistance or through financial markets. The scale of the surpi~es has 
6. Triffin, R. Gold and the Dollar Crisis: 7he Future of Convertibility (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960). 
7. There are but nvo ways that other countries can accumulate reserves in the reserve currency. The reserve currency 
country can have a trade deficit or it can make (ner) investments abroad. In recent years, reserve accumulatiOns 
have re.Bected a huge trade deficit. 
8. Pikeuy (2014), op. cit.; Stiglitz, J.E., 7he Price of lnequaii"ty: How Todtry's Divided Society Endangers Ou; Future (New 
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become huge. But contrary to Bernanke's assertion of a savings glut,9 savings do not 
exceed the investment needs of the global economy, which are huge-retrofitting 
the global economy to face the challenge of global warming and providing the basic 
infrastructure required by developing and emerging economies. The problem is that private 
financial· markets have shown themselves not up to the task, either for the process 
of allocating capital or managing risk. 10 The Bretton Woods institutions themselves have 
not grovJn at the scale required, and the new institutions (the BRICS bank or the Asian 
Investrn~nt Fund), even when fully funded, will also be insufficient to fill the gap. 
The irony is that these failures in global financial markets have occurred even 
though there has been a large increase in capital flows over the past seventy years. 
We are in a world markedly different from that of 1944-or even the early 1970s when 
the origi,nal Bretton Woods system broke down. Then, there was a hope that private 
markets ,might be stabilizing. Some might even have hoped that these capital flows 
could s'!-bstitute for more and better official coordination among central banks. 
In the late 1990s and the years preceding the 2008 crisis, a market fundamentalist 
triumphalism even led the IMF and the US Treasury to advocate stripping away 
restrictions on capital movements. Even then, some academics pointed out that there 
was neither theory nor evidence in support of this view. 11 Now there is a broad consen-
sus against such unfettered flows, reflected in recent IMF positions. 12 
These volatile capital flows, rather than sustaining global aggregate demand, may 
actually undermine it, in several ways. Worried about the consequences, countries 
have an incentive to build up even more reserves. The large exchange rate fluctuations to 
which they give rise have asymmetric effects, with those enabled to expand consumption 
doing so far less than those induced to contract consumption.13 
9. Bernanket B., "The global saving glut and the U.S. current account deficit," a speech at the Sandridge Lecrure, Virginia 
AssociatiOn of Economics, Richmond, Vttginia (March 10, 2005). 
10. Wolf, M., The Shifts and the Shocks (New York: Penguin Press, 2014); Stiglitz (2010), op. cit. 
11. Stiglitz, J.E., Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton Company; 2002). 
12. See Innkational Monetary Fund, ''The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An Institutional View;" 
(2012), -available at http://www.im£org/externaUnp/pp/eng/2012/111412.pdf (last accessed December 28, 2014), 
and several srudies the IMF has conducted in recent years to support: it (http://www.im£org/excernal/pubs/ft/survey/ 
,o/2011/NEW0405 l 1B.hrm). 
13. Greenwald, B. and J.E. Stiglitz, "Financial Market Imperfections and Business Cycles," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
108, 1 (F<bru"Y 1993)0 77-114. 
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Moreover, they make the prospects of moving from a single reserve currency to a 
' multiple reserve currency less propitious. Shifrs in confidence about the differ~nt cur-
: ,rendes can lead to large destabilizing movements in the relative exchange rates' among 
the reserve currency countries. 
Changing institutional arrangements, especially in Europe, and ideologies, have 
compounded the problems. The eurozone has introduced into that region the kind of 
rigidity associated with the gold standard. The structural problems associated with the 
design of the eurozone itself have interacted with the region's commitment to ~usterity 
reduce the deficits of the deficit countries, and increase the surplus of the surplus 
countries, increasing deficits elsewhere in the world, and weakening global aggregate 
demand. 14 But the austerity ideology has found adherents around the world, even as 
the IMF and others have shown the adverse economic effects.15 
The world has once again entered into an era of deficient global aggregate demand. 
Excessively loose monetary policy and deregulation may have, at various times and 
places, provided a temporary respite. But now there is a significant risk of having en-
into an extended period of malaise. 
There is an obvious response: finish the work of Bretton Woods. As I have suggested, 
what Keynes argued for then is even more important today: a global reserve«ystem. 
It is doable. Indeed, within the IMF there is an embryonic form of such a rystem in 
SDRs (special drawing rights). The International Commission of Experts ori Reforms 
of the International Monetary and Financial System appointed by the President of the 
United Nations General Assembly in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis fhich I 
chaired (201 O) urged this, and laid out a number of ways by which it could be done. 
Numerous countries, including China, Russia, and France, have at various times called 
14. Note that since the swn of deficits must equal the sum of surpluses, a reduction in deficits by one country must result 
in either an increase in deficits of others or a reduction of some countries' surpluses. Stiglitz, J.E., "Crises: Principles 
and Policies: With an Application.to the Eurozone Crisis," in J.E. Stiglitz and D. Heymann (eds), Life After Debt: 
The Origins and ResolutWns of Debt Crisis (Houndrnills, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp: 43-79; 
Stiglitz, J.E., "Can the Euro Be Saved? An Analysis of the Future of the Currency Union," Revista di Politica 
Economica (forthcoming). 
15. The argument that there could be expansionary contractions (Alesina, A and S. Ardagna, "Large Changes in Fiscal 
Policy: Taxes versus Spending," in Jeffrey R. Brown (ed.), Tax Policy and the &orwmy, Vol. 24 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 35-68) was quickly refused by Baker (Baker, D., ''The Myth of Expansionary Fiscal Austerity," 
Center for Economic Policy and Research working paper, October 2010), Jayadev and Konczal (Jayadev, A. and M. 
Kona..al, "The Boom Not the Slwnp: The Right Time for Austerity," Roosevelt Institute working paper, 2010), and the 
IMF (International Monetary Fund, 'Will It Hurt? Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Consolidation," in World Economic 
Outlook: Recovery, Risk, and Rebalancing, Washington, DC_: IMF, 2010, pp. 93-124). The argument that countries with 
debt to GDP ratios that were in excess of 90% would face slower growth (Reinhart, C.M. and KS. Rogoff, "Growth 
in a Time of Debt," American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 100 (2010); Reinhart, C.M. and KS. Rogoff, 
"Growth in a Time of Debt," Working Paper 15639, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010, available at: http:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w15639, kst accessed January 1, 2015) 'W3.S subsequently critiqued by Herndon, T., M. Ash, 
and R Pollin, "Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff,~ 
University ofMassachusens Political Economy Research Institute, Working Paper no. 322 (April 15, 2013). -
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for it. Even those at the highest level of the US administration have realized its virtues, 
but fucusing more on the short-term benefits of the exorbitant privilege that being the 
reserve currency -affords in being able to borrow cheaply; than on the long-term adverse 
consequences to domestic demand and growth, they ultimately pushed back and have 
been the major impediment now to the creation of a global reserve system-as they were 
back in 1944, seventy years ago. 
,> 
O~i report argued, however, that there was still a way forward: a coalition of the 
willing, agreements among other countries to develop reserve currency arrangements 
' . 
among themselves. We explained how, eventually, pressure would be brought to bear 
even on the US, even if it mistakenly tries to reap the benefits of the exorbitant 
privilege. 
The current system is inequitable and unstable. And the current system poses a risk 
for an extended period of underperformance of the overall global economic system. 
We are paying a high price for our failure to do what should have been done in 1944. 
Joseph E Stiglitz, Professor, 
Columbia University 
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